INDO-PACIFIC AND ASEAN:
New Balances and New Challenges for Asian Integration and Stability
ISBN 9781032906881
Editors: Claire Thi-Liên Tran, Suthiphand Chirathivat, & Prabir De
Publisher: Routledge, 2025
Reviewed by: Dr Sarita Dash, Dallas, Texas, USA
At dawn, a lone fishing vessel sails across the South China Sea, its crew quietly navigating waters shadowed by great powers. This ordinary scene resonates with ASEAN’s delicate balance between national ambitions and regional centrality. In his preface, Amitav Acharya stresses that the Indo-Pacific’s resilience depends on inclusivity, economic connectivity, and ASEAN centrality. Building on this foundation, the edited volume, “INDO-PACIFIC AND ASEAN: New Balances and New Challenges” by Claire Thi-Liên Tran, Suthiphand Chirathivat, and Prabir De, explores this tightrope walk, shedding light on both the opportunities and fragility of regional cooperation.
During the last decade, the term “Indo-Pacific” has appeared as a strategic concept and a contested framework, arguably key to 21st-century geopolitics. Replacing “Asia-Pacific,” the term represents the dynamics of an interconnected maritime and continental region extending from the eastern shores of Africa to the western coast of the United States. It captures shifting realities shaped by sharper polarisation between the U.S. and China, renewed activism by Japan, India, and Australia, and a mounting chorus of voices debating what “Indo-Pacific” really entails.
“INDO-PACIFIC AND ASEAN” arrives at a critical moment when the Indo-Pacific has become central to global security and economic discourse, alongside the current debates over the strategic and institutional future of Asia. The volume provides a range of perspectives that reflect the evolving geopolitics of ASEAN within the Indo-Pacific framework. Rather than just scanning the surface of diplomatic tensions or trade statistics, the book delves deeply into the new regional balances in ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific region at the diplomatic, strategic, and economic levels. This analysis is set against the current uncertainty of the international order, including those reshaped by the post-COVID-19 crisis, escalating Sino–American relations, the sensitive geopolitical environment in the South China Sea and Taiwan crises, and the implications of the Russia–Ukraine war. While discussions on the Indo-Pacific often revolve around Washington, Tokyo, Canberra, New Delhi, and Beijing, Southeast Asia is the region where the lived reality of the concept will be most intensely experienced. Therefore, instead of simply echoing the usual US-China, ASEAN–China, or ASEAN–US–China discourses, the book focuses on ASEAN’s agency, aspirations, and constraints in an increasingly competitive and uncertain world. Together, these themes form an underlying narrative that binds the whole volume into a single whole.
By placing “ASEAN” at the centre of both the title and discussion, the volume emphasises Southeast Asia’s active agency in balancing relations with major powers while pursuing growth. The introduction, reflected by the book’s subtitle, weaves together the crucial themes of balance and challenge, making clear how regional pressures and ASEAN’s resilience are interrelated within the chapters that follow.
The book is organised into three key parts, each building on the central theme of ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific conundrum. Part I examines the Indo-Pacific from the perspectives of Southeast Asian countries, underlining centrality and multilateralism in an environment of uncertainty, thus laying a solid grounding for the parts that follow.
In Chapter 2, Joefe B. Santarita focuses on ASEAN’s continuing attempts to uphold centrality and relevance against intensifying competition among the US, China, Japan, India, and other powers. Articulating ASEAN’s strategic quandary, Santarita claims that the grouping’s diplomatic standing is of watchful balancing, welcoming external powers on one side and opposing divisive forces on the other. The analysis of ASEAN’s frameworks, including the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), highlights the group’s response as consciously inclusive, rules-based, and focused on cooperation in areas such as connectivity, sustainable development, and maritime governance. However, the chapter misses internal rifts and ASEAN’s capacity constraints, and underexplores great-power challenges. For example, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations underscore ASEAN's dilemma in balancing the economic goals of its member states while maintaining close relationships with key partners, such as India and China. Also, the South China Sea disputes create a complex web of diplomatic tensions, and ASEAN often finds itself caught in the middle. Although the organisation generally speaks of clear strategic goals, the tussle of internal differences and external pressures muddy the waters, revealing a persistent gap between the organisation’s intentions and its actual impact.
In Chapter 3, Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad scrutinises Indonesia’s evolving role in shaping the Indo-Pacific discourse by positioning it within Jakarta’s age-old diplomatic philosophy and regional aspirations. Choiruzzad highlights Indonesia’s leading role in promoting the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) based on inclusivity, development, and economic cooperation and argues that Indonesia establishes itself as both a mediator and a norm-setter and acts as an active agent seeking to shape the regional order.
In Chapter 4, Panitan Wattanayagorn and Tita Sanglee situate Thailand within the evolving Indo-Pacific discourse, focusing on how ASEAN agendas align with Thai national interests. They claim that Thailand views the Indo-Pacific primarily through the lens of balance and equilibrium—both as a member of ASEAN and as a middle state navigating complex relations with the US, China, Japan, and India. The chapter’s forte is its dual-level analysis. At the ASEAN level, the authors emphasise Thailand’s commitment to supporting ASEAN centrality and strengthening the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). At the national level, they highlight Thailand’s unique strategic culture—marked by pragmatism, hedging, and adaptability—that displays its approach to regional power shifts. Recently, Thailand seems to be “hedging” more towards China. If relationships between the U.S. and China worsen, Thailand may tilt towards Beijing.
In Chapter 5, Thi Liên Claire Tran scrutinises Vietnam’s approach towards the Indo-Pacific by situating Vietnam as an active middle power that harnesses bilateral and multilateral partnerships and regional cooperation to protect its sovereignty, promote development, and uphold regional stability. Tran analyses Vietnam’s “bamboo diplomacy” or “Vietnamese middle way” by explaining how it navigates its relations with major powers, especially the United States, Japan, India, Australia, Russia, and the European Union, while simultaneously engaging with China and other ASEAN partners. She further delves into Vietnam’s two-fold tactic, ie, protecting national security, particularly in the South China Sea, and pursuing economic development by increasing regional integration.
In Chapter 6, Cheunboran Chanborey and Chheang Vannarith examine Cambodia’s approach to the Indo-Pacific concept by locating it within the broader ASEAN framework and Cambodia’s own strategic priorities. For Cambodia, the Indo-Pacific is less a theatre for great power competition and more a ground for economic prospects, connectivity, and regional stability. The country relies on ASEAN for diplomatic support while attempting to balance its relationships with major powers, including China, the US, Japan, and India.
In Chapter 7, Chaw Chaw Sein analyses Myanmar’s approach towards the Indo-Pacific, underlining the country’s strategic, economic, and political considerations in dealing with regional and extra-regional powers. The chapter portrays Myanmar as a relatively small and constrained actor, striving to traverse complex geopolitical undercurrents while safeguarding its sovereignty and pursuing economic goals. Sein highlights how Myanmar balances relations with major powers, including China, India, the US, and ASEAN partners, to capitalise on benefits without being over-reliant on any single actor. The chapter highlights Myanmar’s two-fold approach, which includes engaging in multilateral (ASEAN-led initiatives) as well as bilateral partnerships that provide economic and security support. It further explains how Myanmar’s strategy is shaped by infrastructure, trade, and energy initiatives; both within ASEAN and in larger Indo-Pacific arrangements.
In Part II, the chapters scrutinise Indo-Pacific geopolitics from the perspectives of other regional great powers, ie. China, India, Japan, the US, Russia, and France, respectively.
In Chapter 8, Jean-Pierre Cabestan analyses China’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific region, with special attention to its growing relationships with ASEAN and reactions to several regional groupings such as the QUAD and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor. Cabestan highlights that China pursues a two-fold tactic of providing economic enticements through trade, investment, and infrastructure projects, while simultaneously following a solid diplomatic narrative to divide ASEAN consensus where needed. By analysing China’s responses to multilateral frameworks, Cabestan illustrates Beijing’s divide-and-rule strategy—targeting carefully, introducing groundbreaking projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and harnessing bilateral relationships to reduce collective ASEAN resistance. However, including concrete examples of China’s impact on maritime disputes, economic corridors, or ASEAN-led negotiations, and the perspectives of ASEAN member states, would better explain the success and limits of Beijing’s strategies.
In Chapter 9, “Where ‘Act East’ Meets Indo-Pacific: Mapping India’s Eastward Engagement”, Rahul Mishra examines India’s eastward engagement under its “Act East” policy (AEP) and positions it within the broader Indo-Pacific framework. Mishra illustrates how India utilises economic, strategic, and diplomatic tools to enhance its influence in Southeast Asia. India cautiously balances its ties with ASEAN, QUAD partners, and China, while actively promoting trade, connectivity, and security initiatives. The chapter underlines New Delhi’s approach as a blend of capacity-building, economic cooperation, and strategic balancing, targeting greater regional connectivity, trade, and security cooperation. Besides its commitment to promoting a rules-based regional order, India focuses on tangible outcomes through infrastructure schemes, maritime cooperation, and regional economic integration. However, further assessment of its infrastructure, capacity-building, and maritime accomplishments, along with the domestic political, fiscal, and regional challenges, could refine the analysis of India’s Indo-Pacific engagement.
In Chapter 10, Guibourg Delamotte explores Japan’s proactive role in shaping the Indo-Pacific, emphasising how Japan has been the first to construct a regional vision that balances security, economic, and normative goals. Tokyo, through the FOIP (Free and Open Indo-Pacific) initiative, advances the rule of law, connectivity, and quality infrastructure, offering a subtle answer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Japan blends both its history and current strategy, promoting multilateral cooperation, strengthening institution-building, and upholding a rules-based regional order. While being closely tied to the U.S. alliance, Japan expands its partnerships with India, Australia, and ASEAN, thereby shaping norms without domination. The chapter describes Japan as a “subtle leader” trying to influence through ideas, norms, and networks rather than relying entirely on hard power.
In Chapter 11, Murray Hiebert scrutinises the United States’ renewed strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific, assessing both policy goals and regional implications. It begins by outlining the new Indo-Pacific strategy, which is not only about counterbalancing China but also underlines resilience, openness, and alliances as key principles. It outlines Washington’s efforts to strengthen partnerships and coordinate with multilateral frameworks such as multilateralism, ASEAN, the QUAD, and APEC, emphasising that its Indo-Pacific strategy is not only about counterbalancing China but also about shaping norms, rules, and development standards. Towards China, the U.S. strategy is dual: competition in security and technology, along with selective cooperation on global challenges. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, though, provides an alternative to China; limited market access impedes its appeal. Security partnerships, including the QUAD and AUKUS, may reinforce deterrence and generate a lasting strategic presence, yet their ascent prompts concern about potential division within ASEAN. The chapter lacks a detailed analysis of the outcomes of the U.S.-ASEAN and QUAD initiatives, and could benefit from a deeper examination of how Indo-Pacific states, particularly ASEAN members, respond to U.S. engagement.
In Chapter 12, Igor Denisov and Danil Bochkov analyse Russia’s Indo-Pacific outlook from post-Soviet ambiguity to its contemporary pivot to Asia, underlining Moscow’s strategic objectives, economic engagements, and geopolitical priorities. The authors describe Russia’s goals as securing energy and resource interests, expanding trade and investment partnerships, deepening defence and security cooperation, and maintaining strategic flexibility between competing powers. The chapter highlights Moscow’s pragmatic approach, engaging with key Indo-Pacific players, such as China, India, and ASEAN states, while carefully dealing with the U.S. and other Western powers. The chapter outlines Russia’s Indo-Pacific strategy as reactive and defensive, lacking a clear vision, which combines normative engagement, limited economic influence, deepening ties with China, and multilateral participation. Lately, the Ukraine crisis has sped up its eastward orientation, increasing dependence on China while advancing outreach to India and Southeast Asia. The chapter could benefit from a more in-depth examination of how regional states perceive and compare Russia’s intentions with those of the U.S., China, or Europe.
In Chapter 13, David Camroux examines France’s approach to its historical presence in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, its overseas territories, and its aspiration to shape a multilateral order that balances economic, security, and normative matters. The author illustrates continuity and reworking in French policy by emphasising Paris’s dual strategy: deepening bilateral and multilateral relationships with India, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and ASEAN states, while positioning itself within the EU’s collective Indo-Pacific approach. The chapter examines Europe’s gradual awakening to the Indo-Pacific by highlighting both the convergences and divergences among European states and underlining the unique position of France as a resident middle power with territories and military presence, shaping both EU and national agendas. Post-Brexit, the UK seeks to regain global relevance by solidifying its relationships with the U.S. and the Indo-Pacific, especially through AUKUS. Without significant hard power, Germany concentrates on its normative role and economic engagement, presenting itself as a “civilian power”. Ultimately, though France anchors the European presence, the lack of a shared vision keeps Europe as a secondary player compared to the U.S. and regional powers. Its standing will hinge on consistency, resources, and striking a balance between autonomy and transatlantic connections.
Part III of the book concentrates on economic issues across ASEAN in the context of the post-COVID-19 Pandemic. It discusses the competing connectivity strategies and integration challenges that the ASEAN countries are facing.
Chapter 14, by Sineenat Sermcheep, examines the transformative potential of digital technologies in Southeast Asia while highlighting the uneven progress and structural obstacles that confront the region. Digital connectivity emerges not just as an economic device but also as an instrument of influence, shaping the region’s future. Though it is considered a key to ASEAN’s economic integration and competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific, policy and infrastructural gaps could intensify regional disparities. Sermcheep explains how ASEAN must navigate these challenging agendas while safeguarding its own digital sovereignty and ensuring inclusive growth.
In Chapter 15, Amita Batra highlights how economic considerations are shaping the Indo-Pacific by examining India, ASEAN, and the QUAD. She argues that regional cooperation must balance strategic, security, and economic concerns. By focusing on trade, investment, connectivity, and supply chain resilience, the chapter brings balance to a discourse often dominated by geopolitics and military alignments. Batra presents ASEAN as a key partner in India’s Indo-Pacific strategy under the “Act East” policy, while also explaining how the QUAD can complement ASEAN-led initiatives to strengthen regional cooperation. The chapter underscores the commonality of interests in areas of infrastructure development, sustainable growth, digital connectivity, and supply chain diversification. However, it underexamines economic challenges, intra-QUAD divergences, and India’s withdrawal from the RCEP, presenting inadequate empirical detail on specific projects or sectoral partnerships related to ASEAN relations.
In Chapter 16, Thi Anh-Dao Tran scrutinises ASEAN’s engagement with the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) and situates this initiative within the broader Indo-Pacific framework. The chapter presents a noteworthy analysis of how ASEAN interprets and positions itself in relation to competing connectivity projects in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in regard to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Its key strength is its comparative framing of AAGC, presenting ASEAN’s pragmatic balancing—diversifying partnerships, prioritising sustainable connectivity, and reinforcing centrality while engaging in several initiatives, such as the BRI, to hedge between competing powers. However, the chapter highlights limited ASEAN engagement with AAGC, underexplores intra-ASEAN variations (ie, how different member states view the AAGC differently based on their economic and strategic interests), and downplays the role of political and financial constraints on its implementation.
In Chapter 17, Piti Srisangnam provides a forward-looking analysis of potential shifts in global geopolitical trends by 2030, and their implications for the Indo-Pacific and broader regional dynamics. Srisangnam utilises foresight apparatuses, including scenario analysis, trend mapping, and strategic projections, to assess future shifts in power, economics, security, and technology. Against multipolarity, U.S.–China competition, climate change, and innovation that are shaping the Indo-Pacific, the chapter calls for resilience, flexibility, and cooperation. However, except for rich conceptual frameworks, it lacks concrete state-level examples and a deeper scrutiny of the domestic political and economic constraints that shape Indo-Pacific responses.
Finally, in Chapter 18, Suthiphand Chirathivat and Charit Tingsabadh provide a thorough scrutiny of the economic and strategic implications of the Kra Isthmus region and Thailand’s potential canal and landbridge projects in the broader Indo-Pacific context. Combining history, geography, and geopolitics, the authors emphasise the revival of interests in the Kra Isthmus, including its benefits and costs. However, the chapter underexplores challenges such as environment, finance, politics, and rivalries, limiting its depth to diplomatic constraints and competing regional corridors.
As the fishing vessel fades into the morning horizon, it reminds us that the Indo-Pacific is shaped by both extensive strategies by great powers as well as the quiet, cautious manoeuvres of smaller, regional powers.
The book concludes by presenting the Indo-Pacific as a dynamic and complex arena, where ASEAN is at its core. The organisation provides states, both big and small, with a platform to protect national interests, strengthen influence, and foster stability. This volume portrays ASEAN’s quiet strength in the Indo-Pacific balancing trade, security, and digital ties while easing rivalries and guiding states towards cooperation. Thus, ASEAN acts as a steady anchor, guiding the region's fragile currents towards inclusive cooperation and stability in a turbulent Indo-Pacific where major powers dominate, middle powers mediate, and smaller states manoeuvre with caution. Yet, the key question is still there: Can ASEAN's stabilising influence stand up to the Indo-Pacific’s stormy currents?
Though the book aptly captures Southeast Asian perspectives, the omission of Malaysia and Australia is clearly palpable. Given Malaysia’s strategic maritime significance and Australia’s growing role in the Indo-Pacific, their omission has weakened the depth of analysis of Indo-Pacific dynamics. Additionally, the chapters would be more convincing if they incorporated concrete examples and analysed how domestic politics and internal challenges shape each country’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
Overall, “INDO-PACIFIC AND ASEAN: New Balances and New Challenges for Asian Integration and Stability” is a timely, balanced, and insightful contribution to debates about Asia’s future. At a time when ASEAN risks marginalisation by minilateral initiatives, such as the QUAD or AUKUS, the volume argues for its indispensability to any Indo-Pacific order. The volume enlightens scholars, policymakers, and citizens regarding how Southeast Asia can adapt and stay relevant in a world of growing vulnerability. Ultimately, it foregrounds the uncomfortable reality that ASEAN’s valued norms may not be sufficient to navigate the stormy waters of the Indo-Pacific. While the volume doesn’t provide simple solutions, it does provide nuance, precision, and a thought-provoking dose of realism.