The concept of deterrence has undergone three phases since the advent of nuclear weapons. In the Cold War era, the threat of common destruction shared by the United States and the USSR shaped the first phase. The second phase, as Bill Emmott rightly notes, was a decline of deterrence, in the traditional sense, after the fall of the USSR. A shift in Western threat perception from nuclear states to non-state actors marked this phase. The third phase, marked by a resurgence of great power competition, has ensured a revival of deterrence within the ambit of strategy. The author, however, refers to Ukraine, and argues that the first test of deterrence in its third phase turned out to be a failure (p. 10). This failure to deter Russia from invading its neighbour does not bode well for Taiwan, not in the least, given Taiwan’s contested status on the international stage. Furthermore, the motivations behind Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine, and China’s aims with regard to Taiwan differ to an extent. Whereas in the former case, Ukraine’s close relationship to the US and NATO, as well as its potential accession to the multi-national alliance, posed a major security threat to Russia, the latter case is different. China has long-since considered Taiwan its own sovereign territory, and considers American and international support for Taiwan as interference in Chinese internal affairs. This subtle yet poignant difference in motivations and aims presents major challenges to deterrence, and how it plays out in the event of conflict over Taiwan.

Although Chinese threats of unifying Taiwan with the mainland are not new, the rhetoric over reunification, by military force if necessary, has incrementally escalated in the years since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a party Beijing accuses of harbouring secessionist intentions, has been in power. The US, despite having severed official relations with Taiwan in the 1970s, has continued to supply armaments under the aegis of the Taiwan Relations Act. This in tandem with the carefully constructed order borne of an American-led network of alliances in the Pacific, places the US directly in conflict with China over a Taiwan contingency. The author appropriately highlights a mismatch between American policy toward China, in the context of the US-China rivalry, and the intentions with regard to deterring the mainland from using military force to take over Taiwan (p. 62). The author also makes it a point to note that messages to China by American leaders have neither been unified nor consistent (p. 64), creating a lingering sense of uncertainty especially for Taiwan. This in turn, dramatically risks the credibility of American deterrence.

However, if the US and China were to engage militarily over Taiwan despite the aforementioned inconsistency, the author queries how it is to be certain that such a confrontation would not give in to nuclear escalation and spread beyond the Taiwan Strait and into the wider Indo-Pacific. Moreover, this confrontation also raises the question of “whether capturing Taiwan would really be worth putting Beijing at risk, and on the other, whether defending Taipei would really be worth risking Los Angeles” (p. 13). The central thesis of the author’s work, therefore, effectively highlights how complex the Taiwan situation truly is vis-a-vis Ukraine and conventional deterrence. The issue with this, however, is that if the cost of protecting Taiwan might be losing an American city, the US may simply choose to refrain from stepping in to protect the island militarily; rather allowing its support to merely manifest in the form of armament supply and financial aid. Counter-intuitive as it were, such a scenario benefits China, a form of deterrence in itself, and dooms Taiwan.

Of the issues highlighted by the author, one of the most strategically important is the inclusion of US allies in the region, in the eventuality of a Taiwan contingency. While the US may lie across the Pacific Ocean, geographically distant from the island, it has allies such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines in the region. The author notes this by bringing it under the American strategy of ‘integrated deterrence’, with US allies playing an integral and collective role to deter aggression (p. 15). Although the US maintains military bases in these countries, it is pertinent to note that it would implore them to act proactively in defence of Taiwan, were the situation to arise. Also, beyond strategic groupings like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), AUKUS, and allies like the Republic of Korea and the Philippines, Japan is situated and poised to play a decisive, role in the event of conflict of Taiwan.

In stating that “apart from the United States, no Western-aligned country is more important in terms of deterring war over Taiwan than Japan, and no country has a greater interest in contributing to that deterrence, as best it can” (p.115), the author highlights the strategic role, location, and motivation of Japan. This can be seen through two developments: first, Japan’s promulgation of the security legislation in 2015, setting up the legal basis for the Self-Defense Forces to operate overseas under ‘collective self-defence’; and second, key statements by Japanese leaders. In 2021, former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō stated that ‘a Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency’, while former Prime Minister Kishida declared that ‘Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow’ a year later. More recently, the newly elected Prime Minister, Takaichi Sanae ruffled feathers across the sea, in China, by hinting at a possible Japanese intervention in case of an attack on Taiwan.

There exist limits, however, to the extent of deterrence that Japan can provide. As the author mentions, these manifest primarily in Articles 9 and 96 of the Constitution; the former decreeing a pacifist stance, and the latter dealing with constitutional amendment, which has not occurred even once since the Constitution came into effect. Furthermore, the author argues that “unless and until Article 9 has been revised, no Japanese prime minister is likely in peacetime to make an unequivocal public declaration of support for the US and Taiwan” (p. 124). This can be seen in Prime Minister Takaichi’s measured and somewhat vague statement about Japanese involvement if China were to invade Taiwan, and the government's decision to send an emissary to Beijing to clarify that Japan’s position on Taiwan has not changed. Japan’s deterrent value, therefore, the author rightly mentions, remains constrained.

The author concludes by stressing that any potential conflict over Taiwan in the present geopolitical environment is “possible, avoidable, but potentially catastrophic” (p. 162). In doing so, he makes the case for a resurgence of Cold War realism; a framework that shall facilitate a comparatively more effective and less destructive outcome of the US-China rivalry, especially in the context of Taiwan. Another important conclusion made by the author is that there is a need for strategic consistency in policies and messages with regard to Taiwan, and only when this is achieved would deterrence become actually credible. Furthermore, on the diplomatic front, there must exist channels between the US and China pertaining to issues of highest relevance; in this case, Taiwan, most importantly. The text makes compelling arguments, and provides an in-depth analysis of various factors surrounding conflict over Taiwan. For policymakers and political leaders, the author’s analysis is of utmost and urgent importance.